


The Doctrine of Conventionality Control

*Between Uniformity and Legal Pluralism
in the Inter-American Human Rights System*


Pablo González-Domínguez



THE DOCTRINE OF CONVENTIONALITY CONTROL

Between Uniformity and Legal Pluralism
in the Inter-American Human
Rights System

Pablo GONZÁLEZ-DOMÍNGUEZ



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