

## “Makers and Shapers”: Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion

*David R. Davis\**, *Amanda Murdie\*\**, & *Coty Garnett Steinmetz\*\*\**

### ABSTRACT

Do human rights international nongovernmental organizations (HROs) impact public opinion? This article argues that HROs provide information to citizens in repressive regimes about their government’s human rights practices. Without this information, worsening governmental abuse of human rights alone will not lead to fewer people believing their government respects human rights. With increased HRO shaming of the state, however,

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\* *David R. Davis* is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Institute of Human Rights at Emory University. He received his B.A. (1985) University of Maryland, Ph.D. (1992) University of Colorado, Boulder. His research interests include international relations, domestic politics and international conflict, political violence and ethnic conflict, defense economics, and the political economy of development. Teaching interests: international relations, human rights, political violence, research methods. Current research projects include; the durable resolution of ethnic conflict, democratization and ethnic conflict, crisis escalation and domestic-international conflict linkages. He has published widely on the topics of political violence and international relations.

\*\* *Amanda Murdie* is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kansas State University. She also teaches in the graduate program in Security Studies at Kansas State University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from Emory University in May 2009. She earned her B.S. and her M.A. in Political Science from Kansas State University. Murdie’s research focuses on non-governmental actors, human rights, and conflict processes and management. Her work has appeared in *Human Rights Quarterly* and *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. She is working on a book manuscript on the conditional effectiveness of INGOs in human rights and development. Her teaching interests include international organizations, conflict, and quantitative and formal research methods.

\*\*\* *Coty Garnett Steinmetz* is a Master of Arts student in political science at Kansas State University. Her research is on environmental protection and demographics.

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a smaller proportion of people come to believe that their government respects human rights. These hypotheses are tested using an updated dataset on shaming by over 400 HROs, together with never-before-examined data from the World Values Survey on the public's opinion of human rights within a state. The results largely support the article's contention: HROs are powerful conduits through which a population becomes informed of domestic human rights issues. Without HRO shaming, a bad or worsening human rights condition does not diminish the proportion of a population that believes their government respects human rights.

## I. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION

At the end of 1994, the United Nations General Assembly declared 1995 the beginning of the "Decade for Human Rights Education."<sup>1</sup> In doing so, the General Assembly stressed that public awareness of human rights is a necessary precondition to improved human rights practices.<sup>2</sup> Without a motivated domestic population that is aware of its rights, government repression will continue.

The written declaration for the Decade for Human Rights Education makes clear that the rights-awareness process hinges on the actions of human rights international nongovernmental organizations (HROs).<sup>3</sup> These organizations, such as Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), work to educate and change public opinion on human rights issues.<sup>4</sup>

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1. *United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education, adopted* 23 Dec. 1994, G.A. Res. 49/184, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 94th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 100(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/184 (1995).

2. *Id.* at 2

3. *Id.* In this article an international nongovernmental organization (INGO) is minimally defined as any non-profit, open-membership, transparent, and legal organization with a presence in more than one state. This is the definition agreed to in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, the standard reference on INGOs. See UNION OF INT'L ASS'NS [UIA], YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: GUIDE TO GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS (2008) [hereinafter YEARBOOK OF INT'L ORG.]. Within this minimally defined category, however, we focus here on INGOs interested and concerned with policy change and performance related to the hypothetical meta-goal of a world in which there are no human rights violations. See David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, *Measuring the Impact of Human Rights Organizations*, in NGOs AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 225 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. ed., 2001).

4. See Harry M. Scoble & Laurie S. Wiseberg, *Human Rights and Amnesty International*, 413 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 11 (1974); see generally HUMAN RIGHTS INTERNET, HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORY: LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, ASIA (Laurie S. Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble eds., 1981) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORY: LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, ASIA]; Ramesh Thakur, *Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations*, 31 J. PEACE RES. 143 (1994); TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES (Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, & Brian W. Tomlin eds., 1998); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, *ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* (1998); BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995); ANN MARIE CLARK, *DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS* (2001);

Without these organizations, human rights abuses can continue unknown, even to citizens in the abusing country. As such, HROs work not only as namers and shamers of government human rights abuses, but as “makers and shapers” of public opinion” toward those abuses.<sup>5</sup> Through this work, HROs aim to influence public opinion about human rights issues so that increases in domestic pressure on a repressive regime, when coupled with rising international pressure, will eventually improve human rights practices.<sup>6</sup>

Despite their tireless efforts, which the United Nations commended in follow-up reports on the Decade for Human Rights Education, not much is empirically known about the effect HROs have on public opinion.<sup>7</sup> Are HROs actually “makers and shapers” of public opinion? Are they influencing how domestic populations think about human rights abuses in their own countries? Very little has been done to quantitatively examine public opinion toward human rights in repressive regimes.<sup>8</sup> Previous research assessing public

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NGOs AND HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3; GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Robin Cohen & Shirin M. Rai eds., 2000); Kiyoteru Tsutsui & Christine Min Wotipka, *Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations*, 83 SOC. FORCES 587 (2004); STEPHEN HOPGOOD, *KEEPERS OF THE FLAME: UNDERSTANDING AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL* (2006); SCOTT CALNAN, *THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DOMESTIC HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs: A COMPARATIVE STUDY* (2008).

5. CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR., *PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: ROLES AND STRATEGIES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS* 222 (1995).
6. KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; *THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE* (Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999); Amanda Murdie & David R. Davis, *Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs*, INT'L. STUD. Q. (forthcoming Mar. 2012).
7. The theoretical literature, however, clearly lays out this effect. See Scoble & Wiseberg, *Human Rights and Amnesty International*, *supra* note 4; HUMAN RIGHTS DIRECTORY: LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, ASIA, *supra* note 4; M. J. Peterson, *Transnational Activity, International Society and World Politics*, 21 MILLENIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 371 (1992); Alison Brysk, *From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina*, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 259 (1993); Thakur, *supra* note 4; HOWARD B. TOLLEY, JR., *THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS* 7 (1994); Todd E. Jennings, *The Developmental Dialectic of International Human-Rights Advocacy*, 17 POL. PSYCHOL. 77 (1996); TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR, *supra* note 4; KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; WILLIAM KOREY, *NGOs AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS* (1998); *THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS*, *supra* note 6; CLARK, *supra* note 4; *NGOs AND HUMAN RIGHTS*, *supra* note 3; Anthony Tirado Chase, *The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human Development in Yemen*, 17 INT'L J. POL., CULTURE & SOC'Y 213 (2003); Sonia Cardenas, *Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State Behavior*, 6 INT'L STUD. REV. 213 (2004); *GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS*, *supra* note 4; Tsutsui & Wotipka, *supra* note 4; HOPGOOD, *supra* note 4; CALNAN, *supra* note 4.
8. Fathali M. Moghaddam & Vuk Vuksanovic, *Attitudes and Behavior Toward Human Rights Across Different Contexts: The Role of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Political Ideology, and Religiosity*, 25 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 455 (1990); Kathleen Pritchard, *Human Rights: A Decent Respect for Public Opinion?*, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 123 (1991); Christopher J. Anderson, Patrick M. Regan & Robert L. Ostergard, *Political Repression and Public Perceptions of Human Rights*, 55 POL. RES. Q. 439 (2002); Sam McFarland & Melissa Mathews, *Who Cares about Human Rights?*, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 365 (2005); Christopher J. Anderson et al., *In the Eye of the Beholder?: The Foundations of Subjective Human Rights Conditions in East-Central Europe*, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 771 (2005); Matthew Carlson & Ola Listhaug,

opinion toward human rights used samples largely composed of countries that already respected human rights, namely European countries.<sup>9</sup> In addition, no existing large-scale study has examined the HROs' effect on the opinions and rights-awareness of individuals in repressive regimes. Given the central role that both HROs and changes in public opinion play in the theoretical literature on improvements in state human rights practices, this lacuna is potentially problematic.<sup>10</sup>

This article maps the effects of HROs on public perceptions of government repression while hypothesizing that the information HROs provide is central to human rights awareness, especially within repressive regimes. First, HRO "shaming," or dissemination of negative information about a government, is an integral part of the process by which individuals find out about government repression. Without this information, a worsening governmental human rights situation alone will not lead fewer people to believe their government respects human rights. Increased HRO shaming of the state, however, does result in a smaller proportion of the domestic population believing that their government respects human rights. Information from HROs thus serves as a channel through which the population is made aware of the human rights situation within the state. Assessing this empirical relationship analyzes a key mechanism through which HRO action influences attitudes in order to affect change in government practices.

These novel hypotheses are tested using an updated dataset on shaming by over 400 HROs, together with never-before-examined data from the World Values Survey on public opinion of human rights within a state. The results largely support the article's contentions: HROs are powerful conduits through which a domestic population becomes informed of human rights issues. Without HRO shaming, a bad or worsening human rights situation does not diminish the proportion of a population that believes their government respects human rights.

Part II of this article examines the relevant literature and the central argument connecting HRO shaming with public awareness and beliefs on human rights conditions. Part III outlines the research design and methodology, while the fourth Part discusses the empirical results as well as the substantive significance of those results. The article concludes with the implications of these findings for existing theory and for advocates interested in increasing human rights awareness.

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*Citizens' Perceptions of Human Rights Practices: An Analysis of 55 Countries*, 44 J. PEACE RES. 465 (2007); H. Michael Crowson & Teresa K. DeBacker, *Belief, Motivational, and Ideological Correlates of Human Rights Attitudes*, 148 J. SOC. PSYCH. 293 (2008).

9. Anderson, Regan, & Ostergard, *supra* note 8; Anderson et al., *In the Eye of the Beholder?*, *supra* note 8; Carlson & Listhaug, *supra* note 8.

10. WELCH, *supra* note 5; KECK & SIRKINK, *supra* note 4; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6.

## II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY

Existing literature often assumes that much of the impact HROs have on human rights practices hinges on their ability to alter public opinion.<sup>11</sup> While recent research on attitudes toward human rights<sup>12</sup> and several studies address the effects of HROs on human rights practices,<sup>13</sup> extant work does not examine the effects of HROs on this intermediate step: namely, whether HROs actually impact public opinion. This section develops a theoretical argument to connect the work of HROs to public perceptions of human rights conditions, and then outlines the empirical implications that flow from this approach.

### A. The Role of HROs

In their push to promote global human rights, HROs take part in a variety of advocacy activities.<sup>14</sup> Within a repressive state, HROs often work in field-building and mobilization of domestic protest groups and NGOs.<sup>15</sup> For example, HROs helped organize protests for domestic groups in the Philippines in the 1980s.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, in Ukraine in 2005, HROs provided communications equipment and transportation to domestic groups protesting the election results.<sup>17</sup>

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11. Steven Poe & C. Neal Tate, *Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis*, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853 (1994); KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6.
  12. Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, *supra* note 8; Pritchard, *supra* note 8; Anderson, Regan, & Ostergard, *supra* note 8; McFarland & Mathews, *supra* note 8; Anderson et al., *supra* note 8; Carlson & Listhaug, *supra* note 8; Crowson & DeBacker, *supra* note 8; Shareen Hertel, Lyle Scruggs & C. Patrick Heidkamp, *Human Rights and Public Opinion: From Attitudes to Action*, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 443 (2009); Brooke A. Ackerly & José Miguel Cruz, *Hearing the Voice of the People: Human Rights as if People Mattered*, 33 NEW POL. SCI. 1 (2011); Petya Puncheva-Michelotti, Marco Michelotti & Peter Gahan, *The Relationship Between Individuals' Recognition of Human Rights and Responses to Socially Responsible Companies: Evidence from Russia and Bulgaria*, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 583 (2010).
  13. James C. Franklin, *Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America*, 52 INT'L STUD. Q. 187 (2008); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, *Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem*, 62 INT'L ORG. 689 (2008); Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.
  14. See NGOs AND HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 3; WELCH, *supra* note 5; CLIFFORD BOB, THE MARKETING OF REBELLION: INSURGENTS, MEDIA, AND INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2005).
  15. See generally BOB, *supra* note 14; Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.
  16. KURT SCHOCK, UNARMED INSURRECTIONS: PEOPLE POWER MOVEMENTS IN NONDEMOCRACIES 70–71 (2005).
  17. See Report, Celeste A. Wallander, *Ukraine's Election: The Role of One International NGO* (2005), available at [http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/0503\\_ukraine\\_en.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/0503_ukraine_en.pdf); Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West*, 19 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT'L AFF. 21, 27 (2006); Michael McFaul, *Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution*, INT'L SEC., Fall 2007, at 45.

Growing subsets of HROs focus on building human rights awareness in the classroom;<sup>18</sup> as Welch points out, “education classically forms part of promotion” by HROs.<sup>19</sup> For example, the HRO Human Rights Education Associates both works to educate domestic advocates on successful promotion strategies and seeks to add human rights service learning projects into high school and junior high curriculums.<sup>20</sup>

Many HROs try to persuade government officials through direct lobbying to change their practices and adopt human rights norms.<sup>21</sup> For example, HROs in Nigeria provided suggestions for legislation concerning human rights practices to government officials.<sup>22</sup> By engaging in dialogue with government agents, HROs use their positions as “experts” on a particular human rights situation to encourage governments to make concessions with respect to human rights practices and, eventually, internalize human rights norms.<sup>23</sup>

At both the international and domestic levels, HROs often work predominantly through a practice that has been termed “naming and shaming” or “shaming and blaming.”<sup>24</sup> “Shaming” refers to when HROs use information about human rights abuses in the popular media to pressure or “shame” a state regarding its human rights record. For example, after collecting and documenting widespread abuses, many HROs shamed Guatemalan officials in the international media for their part in political disappearances that had occurred within the country in the late 1980s and early 1990s.<sup>25</sup> These efforts were widely reported in newswires from Reuters.<sup>26</sup>

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18. YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORG., *supra* note 3. See Richard Pierre Claude, *Global Human Rights Education: The Challenges for Nongovernmental Organizations*, in HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (George J. Adreopoulos & Richard Pierre Claude eds., 1999).
  19. WELCH, *supra* note 5, at 51.
  20. See Human Rights Education Network, About Us, *available at* [http://hrea.org/index.php?doc\\_id=97](http://hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=97).
  21. THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6; OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, LEGITIMIZING HUMAN RIGHTS NGOs: LESSONS FROM NIGERIA (2006).
  22. OKAFOR, *supra* note 21, at 171–73.
  23. THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6; CLARK, *supra* note 4.
  24. See Hans Peter Schmitz, From Lobbying to Shaming: The Evolution of Human Rights Activism Since the 1940s (unpublished paper prepared for the International Studies Association Meeting 2002), *available at* <http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/schmitz.html>; COALITIONS ACROSS BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST AND THE NEOLIBERAL ORDER (Joe Bandy & Jackie Smith eds., 2005); BOB, *supra* note 14; James Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, *Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986–2000*, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 557, 559 (2005); Franklin, *supra* note 13; Hafner-Burton, *supra* note 13.
  25. Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, *International Norms and Domestic Politics in Chile and Guatemala*, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6, at 172, 183; see generally Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, *Lynchings and the Democratization of Terror in Postwar Guatemala: Implications for Human Rights*, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 640 (2002); KATHRYN SIKKINK, MIXED SIGNALS: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND LATIN AMERICA 192 (2004).
  26. For example, in our dataset on HRO shaming in Reuters, Guatemala is targeted directly by HROs in at least eight stories in 1990.

Through shaming, HROs attempt to inform the domestic population of abuses and encourage domestic groups within the state to continue or heighten political pressure on the government.<sup>27</sup> These reports of abuse can cause domestic individuals and groups to rethink their support of government officials, in some cases leading to calls for regime change. In 1993, for example, reports in Guatemala of widespread human rights abuses under President Serrano's regime helped consolidate power around Ramiro de León Carpio, the nation's former Human Rights Ombudsman, who succeeded Serrano in office.<sup>28</sup>

HROs also use shaming at the international level to encourage third-party states, individuals, and intergovernmental organizations (hereafter IOs) to pressure repressive regimes regarding their human rights records. For example, both the United Nations and the United States cited AI's reports in calling for human rights improvements in Guatemala in the early 1990s.<sup>29</sup> AI also utilized their information on the human rights situation in Guatemala in the early 1990s to motivate its members living outside of Guatemala to spearhead a letter writing campaign concerning the repression occurring within the state.<sup>30</sup> These letters were sent directly to Guatemalan officials and also to government leaders outside of Guatemala to increase pressure and world attention on the atrocities there.<sup>31</sup>

In short, HROs are involved in a variety of activities, including human rights education and direct lobbying of governments. One of HROs' most powerful tools, however, is the "naming and shaming" by which they aim to expand the scope of individuals interested in stopping human rights atrocities in a specific state.

## B. How Does the Work of HROs Impact Human Rights?

The theoretical literature on how improvements in human rights occur pays close attention to the work of HROs. According to Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's "boomerang model," HROs are central in increasing pressure on a domestic state from both "below" and "from above."<sup>32</sup> At the domestic level HROs leverage resources and information to heighten domestic pressure against a repressive regime. Likewise, through their shaming of the repressive state in the popular media, HROs increase and focus international attention on the repressive state, making it susceptible to international scrutiny

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27. KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6.

28. SIKKINK, *MIXED SIGNALS*, *supra* note 25, at 195.

29. See Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.

30. CLARK, *supra* note 4, at 104–05.

31. *Id.* at 71.

32. KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; Brysk, *supra* note 7.

and more inclined to change its practices to avoid further attention or loss of foreign aid.<sup>33</sup> Increased pressure from both within the state and abroad completes what looks like a “boomerang” of advocates, eventually leading to improvements in human rights behavior by the regime.<sup>34</sup>

Building off of the boomerang model, Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink’s “spiral model” focuses on the interactive process of the regime and activists moving a state from active denial of human rights criticism to, at times, full internalization of human rights norms.<sup>35</sup> Under this approach, HRO shaming draws states into a discourse regarding their human rights abuses by inciting them to vocally oppose the shaming done by HROs. When domestic and international criticism of human rights practices continue, the state begins to make “tactical concessions,” such as stopping some very visible abuses or ratifying human rights treaties, to avoid further attention.<sup>36</sup> The spiral model argues that, if domestic criticism continues, these tactical concessions will lead to a process of “controlled liberalization” or regime change.<sup>37</sup> If the state’s behavior remains consistent with their tactical concessions, the state moves into a phase of “prescriptive status.”<sup>38</sup> “[I]nstitutionalization and habitualization” can occur, leading to sustained improvements in human rights practices.<sup>39</sup> What begin as “tactical concessions” become accepted and regular practice, and thus the formerly repressive regime internalizes human rights norms at the last stage of the spiral model.<sup>40</sup>

According to both of these theoretical approaches, the work of HROs is critical in first obtaining and then sustaining the international and domestic pressure essential to this process of human rights improvement. Without the work of HROs, pressure on the regime will likely soften or discontinue, leaving a legacy of mere tactical concessions, if anything. By encouraging domestic and international audiences to see a regime as repressive and join in on the shaming process, HROs perform a key role in achieving human rights improvements.

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33. KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4.

34. *Id.*

35. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, *The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction*, in *THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS*, *supra* note 6, at 1, 17.

36. *Id.* at 25.

37. *Id.* at 28 (internal quotation omitted).

38. *Id.* at 29; Eric Neumayer, *Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?* 49 *J. CONFLICT RES.* 925, 930–31 (2005). This process occurs when states act consistently with their tactical concessions. However, states may act inconsistently with their concessions, as when an increase in human rights violations follows a state’s human rights treaty ratification. For more information on inconsistent behavior, see *id.*

39. Risse & Sikkink, *The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices*, *supra* note 35, at 34.

40. *Id.* at 33.



### C. How Does Public Opinion Interact with HRO Work?

Large-scale empirical studies on the effects of HROs have come to various conclusions regarding the role of HROs in improving human rights practices. Some have found a correlation between the overall number of all types of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) with in-state membership, as a proxy for overall civil society, and better human rights practices.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, Amanda Murdie found that, after accounting for reverse causality, greater numbers of human rights INGOs, as opposed to all INGOs, within a state significantly impacts human rights performance.<sup>42</sup>

Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, James C. Franklin, and Amanda Murdie and David R. Davis, all identify key explanatory variables that focus on HRO shaming in particular.<sup>43</sup> Hafner-Burton focuses on the impact of AI press releases and background reports on human rights performance.<sup>44</sup> Contrary to much of the theoretical literature outlined above, she finds that more AI reports lead to more widespread torture in the next year.<sup>45</sup> Focusing on a sample of seven countries within Latin America, however, Franklin finds that human rights [I]NGO shaming can reduce human rights abuses<sup>46</sup> when coupled with high levels of aid and foreign direct investment in the country.<sup>47</sup>

Murdie and Davis argue that these empirical studies miss the theoretical literature's basic contention that the work of HROs must be coupled with heightened pressure "from above" and "from below."<sup>48</sup> Using a new dataset of shaming by a large number of HROs, their study finds that the impact of HRO's shaming also depends upon either (a) third-party shaming that cites HROs or (b) a domestic presence of HRO members or volunteers within a state.<sup>49</sup> When these domestic and international groups combine efforts, HRO shaming leads to better human rights practices within a country.

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41. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, *Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises*, 110 AM. J. SOC. 1373 (2005); TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 59 (2005); Neumayer, *supra* note 38.
  42. Cardenas, *supra* note 7. Cardenas, however, when not accounting for endogeneity, does not find a robust effect of specifically human rights INGOs within a state on human rights. See Amanda Murdie, Signals without Borders: The Conditional Impact of INGOs (Aug. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University) (on file with author).
  43. Franklin, *supra* note 13; Hafner-Burton, *supra* note 13; Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.
  44. Hafner-Burton, *supra* note 13.
  45. *Id.* at 700.
  46. Franklin, *supra* note 13.
  47. *Id.* at 203.
  48. Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6; Brysk, *supra* note 7; Thomas Rissen & Kathryn Sikkink, *The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction*, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6, at 1, 33.
  49. Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.

None of these empirical studies on the effects of HROs on human rights practices, however, pay any attention to a key intermediary question: whether HROs actually impact public opinion about a state's human rights conditions. The theoretical literature outlined above all hinges on first convincing an international and domestic audience that human rights abuses are occurring. If the international community does not believe that human rights abuses are occurring, it will not pressure the state from abroad. As Ann Marie Clark points out, human rights "NGOs have helped to mold expectations of international behavior and . . . demand that states conform."<sup>50</sup>

Likewise, if the domestic population does not believe that human rights abuses are occurring, it will not pressure the state from below. Lacking support from within a state, human rights improvements would then come solely from sustained international attention because there would be no domestic protests or movements to help in the call to stop repression. The state would also be in a better position to deflect international criticism when its own population does not believe that human rights abuses are occurring. As Risse and Sikink make clear, if the domestic population is supportive of the repressive state, the state can call on international norms of sovereignty and nonintervention to argue against allegations of human rights abuse.<sup>51</sup> In short, if a domestic population does not believe their rights are being violated, it is easy for a repressive government to thwart the reform process outlined in the boomerang or spiral models.

A lack of domestic support has been cited as limiting human rights improvements in the early 1990s in Tunisia, for example.<sup>52</sup> According to Sieglinde Gränzer, when Tunisia violated the human rights of Islamic fundamentalists, most of the domestic population that could have been mobilized against the repression did not believe that these actions were actually human rights abuses.<sup>53</sup> Without domestic support, calls by the international community for improvements in human rights practices within Tunisia "were bound to fail."<sup>54</sup> Without the support of the domestic population it is difficult, if not impossible, for other advocacy actors to be successful in their attempts to apply pressure for human rights improvements.

On the other hand, HROs and other advocacy actors may be less likely to focus or continue their efforts on the specific issue when the domestic

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50. CLARK, *supra* note 4, at 141.

51. See, e.g. Anja Jetschke, *Linking the Unlinkable International Norms and Nationalism in Indonesia and the Philippines*, in *THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS*, *supra* note 6, at 134, 172.

52. Sieglinde Gränzer, *Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco*, in *THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS*, *supra* note 6, at 109, 128–29.

53. *Id.*

54. *Id.* at 129.

population is unlikely to believe that a specific situation constitutes a human rights abuse.<sup>55</sup> Keck and Sikkink refer to this bias as one of salience; advocacy actors are more likely to focus and be successful on issues that have greater salience with both the domestic and international community.<sup>56</sup> The dissonance between international and domestic attitudes toward female genital cutting could, for example, be one reason HROs have moved away from focusing on this controversial issue.<sup>57</sup> Likewise, as R. Charlie Carpenter points out, a lack of salience has prevented the issue of children born as a result of rape from ever entering the wide scale advocacy agenda.<sup>58</sup> In short, a perceived inability to leverage domestic public opinion can lead to HROs to devote only limited attention to these issues.

On issues where domestic public opinion can be swayed, however, HRO attention and information plays a central role in the theoretical framework through which human rights abuses become public knowledge and sustained domestic and international pressure lead to human rights improvements. Risse, Risse and Sikkink, and Keck and Sikkink all agree that human rights issues that relate to violations of basic civil and political rights enjoy widespread salience or resonance.<sup>59</sup> The work of HROs regarding these rights should therefore lead to domestic populations becoming informed and believing that there are violations occurring within a targeted state. Once the domestic population believes that violations are occurring and public opinion is then mobilized, pressure caused by HROs will lead to, at the very least, tactical concessions by the repressive state.<sup>60</sup>

This logic stresses the importance of HRO influence on domestic public opinion concerning fundamental human rights. Although swaying international opinion is also an important HRO goal, domestic support is critical in limiting how the state can respond to human rights criticism. The importance of domestic knowledge of human rights abuses explains the recent move by HROs and the UN to focus on human rights education.<sup>61</sup> If the domestic

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55. KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6.

56. See, e.g., KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4, at 20, 23, 26.

57. Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Fortunata Songora & Gail Foss, *International Discourse and Local Politics: Anti-Female-Genital-Cutting Laws in Egypt, Tanzania, and the United States*, 48 SOC. PROB. 524 (2001); ELIZABETH HEGER BOYLE, FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING: CULTURAL CONFLICT IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 67–72 (2002); BOB, *supra* note 14, at 28–32.

58. R. Charli Carpenter, *Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks*, 51 INT'L. STUD. Q. 99, 99–100 (2007).

59. Thomas Risse, *Transnational Actors and World Politics*, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 255 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, & Beth Simmons eds., 2002); Risse & Sikkink, *The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices*, *supra* note 35; KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4.

60. Risse & Sikkink, *The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices*, *supra* note 35, at 25.

61. See *United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education*, *supra* note 1.

population does not know what their human rights are or does not have information on human rights abuses by their government, it is unlikely the improvements in human rights will occur. Without increased attention and information from HROs, the mere fact that a state has a poor human rights record will not necessarily correlate to a negative domestic public opinion regarding the government's behavior.

The questions raised by the research explored above may be framed as three hypotheses, which this article will then address:

- HYPOTHESIS 1: A poor or worsening human rights record does not alone correlate to a poor domestic human rights opinion.

Without the work and information of HROs, domestic citizens are more likely to remain uninformed about the human rights practices of their government. Gurr's work on relative deprivation, which finds that a domestic population expecting very little from its government will not demand much, supports this view.<sup>62</sup> As such, a population with bad or deteriorating human rights may lack any expectation of human rights improvements.

- HYPOTHESIS 2: A poor or worsening human rights record, when coupled with increased HRO shaming, will be associated with a poor domestic human rights opinion.

HROs can powerfully influence domestic public opinion and much of their work, especially their shaming activities, is designed to inflame individuals about a country's human rights practices.

- HYPOTHESIS 3: Increased HRO shaming will be associated with a poor domestic human rights opinion.

Although many contend that HROs can go too far in their shaming activities,<sup>63</sup> the correlative is that HRO attention alone, *even without* a worsening human rights record, may be sufficient to influence domestic opinion about human rights within a state. The information HROs provide, because of their status as experts, may be believed regardless of the human rights situation within the state.<sup>64</sup> This is not to argue that HROs go out of their way to shame non-abusers; increased HRO attention, however, could have a non-conditional negative impact on domestic opinion regarding human rights.

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62. TED ROBERT GURR, *WHY MEN REBEL* 22 (1970).

63. Abudullahi An-Na'im, *Toward a More People-Centered Human Rights Movement*, in *HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM THE FRONTIERS OF RESEARCH* 33 (Diana Amnéus & Goran Gunner eds., 2002); BOB, *supra* note 14, at 184–186; Hafner-Burton, *supra* note 13.

64. CLARK, *supra* note 4.

Each of these hypotheses focuses on shaming activities by HROs because this key activity provides specific negative information regarding human rights practices that is necessary to change domestic public opinion. One should remain aware, however, that information about human rights can be transmitted through other HRO activities, such as human rights education programs operated by HROs within states. As outlined below, this article seeks to evaluate these hypotheses in light of these alternative activities through which HROs also convey information about human rights practices to domestic populations.

### III. RESEARCH DESIGN

To test the three hypotheses laid out above, an expanded dataset of HRO shaming and activities is used together with previously unexamined data on domestic public opinion regarding human rights. The findings demonstrate relatively strong support for this article's central argument concerning the role HROs have in influencing domestic human rights opinion. The research design is described in detail, followed by the results of the statistical models.

#### B. The Dependent Variable

This article's hypotheses require information on a domestic population's opinion concerning human rights practices within their country. For this information, this study relies on a question from the World Values Survey 1980–2008.<sup>65</sup> Beginning in 1996, the World Values Survey asked individuals periodically in sixty-eight countries the following question and provided the following scale for responses:

How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays (in our country)?

Do you feel there is:

1 A lot of respect for individual human rights

2 Some respect

3 Not much respect

4 No respect at all

9 Don't know<sup>66</sup>

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65. WVS Research Group, Codebooks for World Values Survey (2000), available at [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folders\\_published/survey\\_2000/files/root\\_q\\_2000.pdf](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folders_published/survey_2000/files/root_q_2000.pdf).

66. *Id.*

When asked this question, overall, 13.53 percent of people responded “a lot of respect,” 41.90 percent responded “some respect,” 31.45 percent responded “not much respect,” and 13.13 percent responded “no respect at all.”

For this analysis, given the country-year nature of the independent variables, together with the goal of explaining variation across countries, this question from the World Values Survey is used to create a summary measure of the proportion of individuals who report “a lot of respect” for individual human rights or “some respect” within the country-year. Therefore higher values on this measure, which is used as the dependent variable in the analysis, indicate a higher proportion of individuals within the country who think there is some or a lot of respect for human rights. Lower values, conversely, indicate that more of a population believes there are human rights problems within the state. The countries with the lowest proportion of individuals reporting “a lot” or “some” respect are Moldova in 2006, with 14.5 percent, and Peru in 2008, with 13.8 percent.

## B. Key Independent Variables

For Hypothesis 1, concerning the impact of actual human rights practices on domestic opinion, the study relies on the David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards CIRI dataset.<sup>67</sup> Summary measures of both Physical Integrity Rights and Empowerment Rights are appropriate for this particular research question. Physical Integrity Rights are evaluated by a nine point index (from zero to eight) that measures respect for freedom from torture, extrajudicial killings, political disappearances, and political imprisonments; higher scores indicate better human rights performance.<sup>68</sup> Empowerment Rights are evaluated by an eleven point index (from zero to ten) and measures respect for freedom of movement, speech, workers’ rights, political participation, and religion.<sup>69</sup>

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67. David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, CIRI Variables List and Short Description (2010), available at <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation.asp>. Results also remain substantively and statistically similar when either the Political Terror Scale (State Department) or the Political Terror Scale (Amnesty International) is used. For Hypothesis 1, our main result—that human rights performance alone has no influence on human rights opinion—holds. For Hypothesis 2, the key independent variable—the interaction term between human rights performance and increased shaming—is not statistically significant at conventional levels but does include a 95% confidence interval in the expected direction. For Hypothesis 3, the results hold for both increased HRO shaming and HRO membership. These results are available by request ([amurdie@ksu.edu](mailto:amurdie@ksu.edu)). See Reed M. Wood & Mark Gibney, *The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI*, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 367–400 (2010).

68. Cingranelli & Richards, *supra* note 67.

69. *Id.*

In addition to measuring raw levels of respect for these rights, whether conditions are worsening or improving must also be measured. To do so, this study employs a model that substitutes the raw levels of these variables with a dichotomous indicator for whether each respective scale is getting worse. For this indicator, a country is coded as having a Worsening Physical Integrity score if the physical integrity score in year  $t$  is less than the score in year  $t-1$ ; whereas if the score is stagnant or improves, the country-year receives a code of zero. The same coding process is repeated for the variable Worsening Empowerment Rights. This coding system presumes that a government that increasingly abuses human rights may be negatively viewed by the domestic public.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 require a measurement of HRO shaming. For this, the study relies on Murdie and Davis's data on targeting by HROs toward governments in Reuters Global News Service.<sup>70</sup> For this data, Murdie and Davis first compiled a list of all 432 INGOs with a predominant human rights focus in the Yearbook of International Organizations<sup>71</sup> This list was used to parse out only instances where HROs were directly targeting governments or government leaders in Reuters Global News Service.<sup>72</sup> The resulting instances or events of HRO shaming were aggregated to the country for each year. For example, when HRW criticized China for their human rights record in December of 2004, this would be included in the Murdie and Davis measure.<sup>73</sup>

The measure used here is a dichotomous indicator of whether shaming by HROs is increasing from year  $t-1$  to  $t$ . This measure, Increased HRO Shaming, best captures the idea that the overall level of shaming does not catch a domestic person's attention, but rather an increase in the level of shaming. Murdie and Davis argue that focusing on changes or increases in HRO shaming better reflects the concept of "campaigning" central to the boomerang and spiral models.<sup>74</sup> In other words, by focusing on Increased HRO Shaming instead of raw levels, our assessment remains cognizant of how HROs often operate, targeting discrete regions for short time periods in order to leverage resources.

For Hypothesis 2, the focus centers on the conditional effect increased HRO shaming has on domestic public opinion. For this effect, our measure of Increased HRO Shaming interacts with Worsening Physical Integrity Rights.

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70. Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.

71. YEARBOOK OF INT'L ORG., *supra* note 3; Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.

72. Gary King & Will Lowe, *An Automated Information Extraction Tool For International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design*, 57 INT'L ORG. 617 (2003).

73. Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6.

74. Murdie & Davis, *supra* note 6; see Murdie, *supra* note 42.

Given that physical integrity rights represent the main focus of HROs, HRO shaming presumably provides the most information to a domestic population about these rights in particular. These rights also form the bulk of the rights implicated in the boomerang and spiral models.<sup>75</sup>

Hypothesis 3 focuses on the effect of increased HRO shaming alone on domestic public opinion. For this model, therefore, Increased HRO Shaming is simply used as the key independent variable.

### C. Controls and Model Specification

In all models, there are controls for GDP per Capita (natural log), Population (natural log), War, and Polity Score. These controls come from Poe and Tate's classic model of human rights determinants and have been used in more limited tests of human rights opinion.<sup>76</sup> Following Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, all constituent terms are included when using an interaction term.<sup>77</sup> Also, human rights conditions continue to be controlled for in all the models. The variable, GDP per Capita (natural log), is used to account for existing arguments of better human rights in well developed countries.<sup>78</sup> This data is from the 2010 World Development Indicators (WDI).<sup>79</sup> The variable, Population (natural log), also from the WDI, accounts for any negative impact large population size has on human rights conditions.<sup>80</sup> Similarly, War is used to account for the negative impact of civil or international war on human rights.<sup>81</sup> This measure comes from the Armed Conflict Program Dataset and is a dichotomous measure of whether international or civil war occurred within the country.<sup>82</sup> Finally, regime type has been often connected to better human rights practices.<sup>83</sup> To capture this

75. KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6.

76. Poe & Tate, *supra* note 11. See Carlson & Listhaug, *supra* note 8.

77. Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark & Matt Golder, *Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses*, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 63, 64, 66 (2006).

78. Poe & Tate, *supra* note 11.

79. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: 2010 (2010) available at <http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-final.pdf>.

80. *Id.* See, e.g., Conway W. Henderson, *Population Pressures and Political Repression*, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993).

81. Amanda Murdie and David R. Davis, *Problematic Potential: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars*, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 49 (2010).

82. Centre for the Study of Civil War, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Peace Research Institute Oslo, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v4-2009, available at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_prio\\_armed\\_conflict\\_dataset](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset).

83. Poe & Tate, *supra* note 11; Christian Davenport & David A. Armstrong II, *Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996*, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 538 (2004).



idea, the study uses the twenty-one point Polity scale; lower values indicate autocratic regimes and higher values indicate democratic regimes.<sup>84</sup>

Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, an ordinary least squares model is employed with robust standard errors clustered on country. Because of the data availability for some of the independent variables, the sample is restricted to the years between 1996 and 2007, inclusive. Further, because the interest is not in countries with ideal human rights records, the study focuses only on countries with less than an eight on the CIRI Physical Integrity Scale. Importantly, however, all the results remain the same in terms of sign and significance if these high performers are included in the sample. All independent variables are lagged in the model.<sup>85</sup> This specification results in roughly ninety country-years for each model. All summary statistics are provided in Table 1.<sup>86</sup>

**Table 1: Summary statistics**

VARIABLES	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
Proportion Reports "A Lot" or "Some" Respect for HR	0.514	0.196	0.145	0.897	92
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	4.75	1.942	0	7	92
CIRI Empowerment Rights	6.533	2.861	0	10	92
Population (ln)	16.909	1.577	13.538	20.995	92
GDP per Capita (ln)	7.91	1.434	5.481	10.552	92
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	5.185	5.67	-10	10	92
War on Location	0.13	0.339	0	1	92

#### IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Overall, the hypotheses find much support. A poor or worsening human rights condition, on its own, does not significantly impact domestic public

84. Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010 (2007)*, available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.

85. Endogeneity is not a statistical issue with this specification, as evidenced by a non-significant Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test when utilizing the specification outlined in Murdie, *supra* note 42.

86. A list of the country-years used in this sample is available by request (amurdie@ksu.edu). The country coverage is remarkably diverse, including both high performing democracies and dictatorships with low human rights scores in the sample.

opinion; the proportion of people who think that their government has some or a lot of respect for human rights does not vary much. However, when the human rights condition worsens and HROs increase their shaming campaigns, people's perception of their country's respect for human rights changes: the domestic population is less likely to believe that their government respects human rights. Furthermore, increased shaming alone is enough to negatively impact public opinion. These findings highlight the significant informational role HRO shaming plays within repressive states. Without increased shaming by HROs, a worsening human rights condition alone is not enough to make a population believe their rights are not being protected.

### A. Original Model

As Hypothesis 1 suggests, human rights conditions, as measured by levels of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights or CIRI Empowerment Rights within a state, are not associated with domestic public opinion concerning human rights. As a basic illustration of this, Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights and the dependent variable for all countries in the dataset. In many countries with perfect or near perfect physical integrity rights, less than half the population reports that their country has some of lots of respect for human rights. Other countries, such as Vietnam in 2001, for example, have very low physical integrity rights and yet still have a large percentage of their population that believes their country respects human rights.

Further, the multivariate analysis of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights or CIRI Empowerment Rights on domestic opinion, as shown in Table 2, supports Hypothesis 1. Neither of the human rights variables are statistically significant. Of the control variables that are statistically significant, it is interesting to note that GDP Per Capita is positively associated with the public's perception of good human rights while Polity is negatively associated with the public's perception of good human rights. This finding supports Gurr's relative deprivation concept and the general idea that empowered people are more likely to demand more in terms of human rights from their government.<sup>87</sup>

Table 3 reports the results of the statistical model where Worsening human rights scales were also included. Worth noting, a Worsening CIRI Physical Integrity Rights situation within the country is actually positively associated with domestic opinion of the country's respect for human rights. This finding highlights, perhaps, the limited information populations have about human rights conditions within their own country. This result also lends itself to another interpretation: people subject to increasing repression may be more inclined to give positive remarks, knowingly false or

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87. GURR, *supra* note 62.



**Table 2. Impact of Human Rights Conditions, Measured as Levels, on Proportion of Population Reporting “Some” or “A Lot” of Respect for Individual Human Rights Within Country, OLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors (Clustered on Country), 1996–2007.**

VARIABLES	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights <sub>t-1</sub> (0.016)	-0.018
CIRI Empowerment Rights <sub>t-1</sub> (0.012)	0.016
Population (ln) <sub>t-1</sub> (0.016)	0.018
GDP per Capita (ln) <sub>t-1</sub> (0.024)	0.062*
Polity Score (-10 to 10) <sub>t-1</sub> (0.005)	-0.010*
War on Location <sub>t-1</sub> (0.084)	0.043
Intercept (0.265)	-0.259
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N	92
R <sup>2</sup>	0.239
F <sub>(6,68)</sub>	4.004
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1(two-tailed)	
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not, about their government in order to avoid repression. The Soviet Union under Stalin exemplified this false-positive reporting behavior and lack of information, complementing both interpretations. In an attempt to ensure a smoothly running country, Stalin had a vested interest in misinforming the public about the reasons for detaining large numbers of Soviet citizens in the GULAGs. Often those repressed were legally detained under allegations of treason demonstrated in show trials. These legal processes kept the population misinformed to some degree regarding human rights abuses. However, as more citizens were detained for treason, the population increasingly felt compelled to prove allegiance to the regime in order to avoid accusations of treason.<sup>88</sup>

88. See, e.g., GOLFO ALEXOPOULOS, *STALIN'S OUTCASTS: ALIENS, CITIZENS, AND THE SOVIET STATE, 1926–1936*, at 77–79 (2003); *STALIN'S TERROR: HIGH POLITICS AND MASS REPRESSION IN THE SOVIET UNION* (Barry McLoughlin & Kevin McDermott eds., 2003).

**Table 3: Impact of Worsening Human Rights Conditions on Proportion of Population Reporting “Some” or “A Lot” of Respect for Individual Human Rights Within Country, OLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors (Clustered on Country), 1996–2007**

<i>VARIABLES</i>	<i>Coefficient (Std. Err.)</i>
Worsening CIRI Physical Integrity Rights t-1	0.111** (0.038)
Worsening CIRI Empowerment Rights t-1	0.008 (0.046)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights t-1	-0.010 (0.015)
CIRI Empowerment Rights t-1	0.017 (0.012)
Population (ln) t-1	0.026 (0.016)
GDP per Capita (ln) t-1	0.059** (0.022)
Polity Score (-10 to 10) t-1	-0.010‡ (0.005)
War on Location t-1	0.064 (0.078)
Intercept	-0.436 (0.267)
N	89
R2	0.294
F (8,67)	6.562

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1(two-tailed)

Although worsening human rights conditions do not alone lead to negative domestic opinion regarding a country’s respect for human rights, when a worsening human rights condition is combined with increased shaming by HROs, public opinion does become more negative. The empirical model results found in Tables 4 and 5 thus support Hypothesis 2. Table 4 shows that the interaction between increased HRO shaming and a worsening physical integrity score has a negative and statistically significant impact on domestic opinion regarding a country’s respect for human rights. Table 5 illustrates the substantive significance of this finding: without increased HRO shaming, the domestic population within a state actually retains a very good opinion of

**Table 4: Impact of Worsening Human Rights Conditions, Conditioned by HRO Shaming, on Proportion of Population Reporting "Some" or "A Lot" of Respect for Individual Human Rights Within Country, OLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors (Clustered on Country), 1996–2007**

<i>VARIABLES</i>	<i>Coefficient (Std. Err.)</i>
Increased HRO Shaming * Worsening CIRI Physical Integrity t-1	-0.217* (0.085)
Increased HRO Shaming t-1	-0.045 (0.055)
Worsening CIRI Physical Integrity Rights t-1 (0.040)	0.125**
Worsening CIRI Empowerment Rights t-1	-0.009 (0.046)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights t-1	-0.011 (0.016)
CIRI Empowerment Rights t-1	0.016 (0.012)
Population (ln) t-1	0.029‡ (0.016)
GDP per Capita (ln) t-1	0.058** (0.021)
Polity Score (-10 to 10) t-1	-0.012* (0.005)
War on Location t-1	0.048 (0.081)
Intercept	-0.455‡ (0.273)
N	89
R <sup>2</sup>	0.331
F (10,67)	20.195

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1(two-tailed)

**Table 5: Substantive Impact of Increased HRO Shaming and Worsening Human Rights on Proportion of Population Reporting “Some” or “A Lot” of Respect for Individual Human Rights Within Country, 1995–2006**

	<i>Increased HRO Shaming = 0</i>	<i>Increased HRO Shaming = 1</i>
Worsening CIRI Physical Integrity = 0	49.20% [44.11–54.25]	42.54% [32.76–52.81]
Worsening CIRI Physical Integrity = 1	61.84% [54.76–69.08]	36.82% [28.50–44.60]

All proportions estimated using statistical model from Table 4 and CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). Control variables set at their mean/median. 95% confidence intervals reported in brackets.

their human rights condition. When HRO shaming increases, however, the proportion of the population that believes the domestic human rights situation is positive drops over twenty percentage points. These results indicate that the information provided by HROs through their shaming activities plays a vital role in educating domestic populations regarding their worsening human rights condition.

Finally, Table 6 shows the results of the non-conditioned HRO shaming variable on domestic public opinion. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, increased HRO shaming alone negatively impacts public perceptions of human rights circumstances. Substantively, when HRO shaming increases, holding all other variables at their mean or median if dichotomous, the proportion of people reporting a lot or some human rights respect within their country falls by 9.96 percent (95 percent confidence interval from -0.09 percent to -20.2).

**B. Robustness Check with HRO Membership**

As mentioned above, HROs often utilize activities other than shaming to impact domestic public opinion about human rights conditions. These activities, such as providing educational outreach programs or field-building activities, typically occur when HROs have an active presence within a state.<sup>89</sup> As a robustness check, therefore, a count of HROs with an active

89. Murdie, *supra* note 42.

**Table 6: Impact of HRO Shaming on Proportion of Population Reporting “Some” or “A Lot” of Respect for Individual Human Rights Within Country, OLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors (Clustered on Country), 1996–2007**

VARIABLES	Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Increased HRO Shaming t-1	-0.100* (0.048)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights t-1	-0.010 (0.017)
CIRI Empowerment Rights t-1	0.016 (0.013)
Population (ln) t-1	0.030‡ (0.017)
GDP per Capita (ln) t-1	0.056* (0.024)
Polity Score (-10 to 10) t-1	-0.011* (0.005)
War on Location t-1	0.050 (0.086)
Intercept	-0.433 (0.260)
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N	89
R <sup>2</sup>	0.251
F (7,67)	5.29

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1(two-tailed)

volunteer or membership base within a country (the HRO Membership Base) is substituted in the statistical model used to test Hypothesis 3. This data comes from Murdie’s updated dataset, which is based on Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest’s work and is collected from the same Yearbook of International Organizations used in gathering the list of HRO names for the Union of International Associations.<sup>90</sup> Reflecting Murdie and the operationalization used on the shaming variable, this variable is coded as Yearly Increase in HRO Membership Base.<sup>91</sup>

90. Jackie Smith & Dawn Wiest, *The Uneven Geography of Global Civil Society: National and Global Influences on Transnational Association*, 84 SOC. FORCES 621 (2005); YEARBOOK OF INT’L ORG., *supra* note 3.

91. Murdie, *supra* note 42.



**Table 7: Impact of HRO Membership on Proportion of Population Reporting “Some” or “A Lot” of Respect for Individual Human Rights Within Country, OLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors (Clustered on Country), 1996–2007**

<i>VARIABLES</i>	<i>Coefficient (Std. Err.)</i>
Increased HRO Membership t-1	-0.082* (0.037)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights t-1	-0.020 (0.017)
CIRI Empowerment Rights t-1	0.019 (0.012)
Population (ln) t-1	0.014 (0.016)
GDP per Capita (ln) t-1	0.060** (0.022)
Polity Score (-10 to 10) t-1	-0.012* (0.005)
War on Location t-1	0.042 (0.088)
Intercept	-0.132 (0.263)
N	92
R2	0.28
F (7,68)	5.276

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1(two-tailed)

As shown in Table 7, an increased number of HROs with a domestic membership base correlates to a lower proportion of the population feeling that their country has a lot of respect or some respect for human rights. Substantively, an increase in the number of HROs with domestic membership is associated with an 8.23 percent drop in the proportion of individuals who say their country has a lot of respect or some respect for human rights (95 percent confidence interval from -0.6 percent to -15.9).

Taken together, these results highlight the powerful informational role that HROs fulfill. When HROs increase their shaming or domestic presence, opinions about human rights conditions within a state change. In line with

the theoretical literature, HROs provide the first step in the process toward human rights improvements.<sup>92</sup>

## V. CONCLUSION

Do HROs impact domestic public opinion regarding a state's respect for human rights? This study suggests that the answer is a resounding "yes." Increased HRO shaming or domestic presence leads to a more negative domestic opinion regarding human rights conditions. These results thus support the basic contention of the UN General Assembly: HROs are crucial actors in the field of human rights education.<sup>93</sup> This research also supports the basic contentions of both the boomerang and spiral models of human rights improvements.<sup>94</sup>

Though the current study is an important first step, future research in the same vein should focus on HROs' impact on public opinion about the human rights conditions in other countries. In other words, do HROs have the same ability to influence foreign and international public opinion regarding respect for human rights in a particular country? As noted above, the effectiveness of HROs in this field is also critical in the theoretical literature on the process of human rights improvement. Though no existing wide scale survey addresses this particular issue, it remains an important area of future inquiry.

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92. All our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for freedom of the press. These results are also available by request (amurdie@ksu.edu).

93. See *United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education*, *supra* note 1.

94. KECK & SIKKINK, *supra* note 4; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 6.